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*W Bunsy*

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June 23, 1961

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McGB/WWR

The new SNIE on Soviet responses in Berlin crisis is interesting in several respects. In all cases the Soviet effort would be the minimum they consider necessary to thwart our initiative, because of their fear of escalation.

- (a) I'm impressed with the estimate that USSR would probably use East German troops initially, committing Soviet forces only if GDR couldn't cope. This is a powerful reason for having the initial probe a big one.
- (b) The Soviets would be very unhappy if West German forces were used, since they would fear the conflict would transform itself into a "liberation campaign". This suggests that we ought to threaten use of Bonn forces if they use East German troops, whether or not we actually do so.
- (c) I am struck by estimate (paragraph 14) that Soviets probably would not fire on our aircraft, but would use means of interference short of this. I still feel that an airlift may be a useful first step prior to probe.
- (d) Walt, note the negative estimate (paragraph 21) of the likelihood of public uprising in East Germany. Even so, however, evidence of our intent and ability to stir things up might have a significant deterrent impact.

*RWK*  
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cc: Mr. Owen

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